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OF THE STATE ()F UTAH
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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Respondents argue that testimony concerning an
agreement establishing the boundary line in question
was not admissible because of the "dead man" statute,
and also that there had not been sufficient "acquiescence" by respondents to establish a boundary line. In
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addition, the respondent, Carter, by cross appeal contends that the trial court erred in refusing to award
damages.

ARGUMENT
1. THE "DEAD MAN" STATUTE HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.

It is contended by Carter and Dover that the "dead
man" statute, section 78-24-2 ( 3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, effectually prevents the defendant, Lindner,
from testifying as to the agreement with Robert Dover
for the location of the boundary fence.

'

The "dead man" statute has no application to this
case. It will be noted that by its express language it
applies to civil actions " ... when the adverse party in
such action, suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues,
or defends, as guardian of an insane or incompetent
person, or as the EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR, HEIR, LEGATEE OR DEVISEE OF
ANY DECEASED PERSON, or as guardian, assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, or transaction
with, such deceased, insane or incompetent person, or
matter of fact whatever ... " (emphasis added)

,

The grantee mentioned in the statute must be a
"grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or
devisee". (emphasis added) .
2
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In the case of Anderson v. Johnson, 121Utah173,
239 P.2d 1073, one Marie T. Johnson, a daughter of
the deceased person, who defended as a grantee under
a deed recorded the day before her father died was not
within the purview of the "dead man" statute and was
a competent witness. The Supreme Court said:
" ... In applying the provisions of the above
statute, the court took the view that Marie T.
Johnson, one of the respondents, was defending
as an heir. If Marie were defending as an heir,
she would have been defending for the benefit of
the estate of the deceased. However, this she
clearly was not doing. She claimed that property
as a grantee and not for the benefit of the estate ... "
See also Grieve v. Howard, 54 Utah 225, 242, 180
P. 423, in which the court said:
" ... As the defendant, Mark Howard, was
not opposing or defending as guardian, executor, administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of
the deceased, or as guardian, assignee, or grantee
of such heir, legatee or devisee, we cannot understand how the testimony of appellant was prohibited, even if it was concerning a fact equally
within the knowledge of the witness and the
deceased. A reasonably careful analysis of this
statute will conclusively demonstrate that, in
view of the relation and character of the parties,
the matter was not within the statute. As we
understand the situation, defendant was defending not as an heir of the deceased, but as a
grantee under the deed executed by her. The relation was not such as to entitle him to object
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to the testimony on the grounds that it was prohibited by the statute. Miller v. Livingstone,
31 Utah at page 435, 88 Pac. 338; 40 Cyc. 2270
to 227 5, inclusive . . ."
The testimony of Mr. Lindner as to the agreement
for the location of the fence without survey was clearly
admissible. In this case there was no heir, legatee or
devisee involved. Mr. Carter's immediate predecessor
did not acquire title as an heir but as a grantee under
a Quit Claim Deed dated December 7, 1957, Exhibit
P-2. In this suit no one sued or defended as a guardian
or as executor, or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee
of any deceased person as required by the statute. The
agreement was immediately acted upon by the construction by the defendants of a permanent fence which
has marked the boundary since 1955.

1

2. THE BOUNDARY LINE WAS ESTABLISHED BY AGREEMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF THAT AGREEMENT.
The boundary line was established by agreement
between Mr. Lindner and respondents' predecessor,
Robert Dover, in 1955. The construction of a six-foot
chain link fence with posts set in concrete in 1955 (R.
17, 19) is evidence of the performance of the agreement.
Respondent seems to suggest that the principle of '
boundary by agreement is the same as the principle
of boundary by acquiescence except for the agreement
and uncertainty at the time of agreement. (Respondents' Brief, p. 7).

4
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Uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line is
an element of both boundary by agreement, and boundary by acquiescence as is pointed out in Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2d 202, at page 207 and
followed in Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 23, 239 P.2d
205. It is also stated that where there is no uncertainty
or dispute as to the true boundary neither oral agreement nor acquiescence is sufficient to establish the
boundary.
The rule of boundary by acquiescence is further
stated in Brown v. Milliner, supra:
" ... We have further held in this state that
in the absence of evidence that the owners of
adjoining property or their predecessors in
interest ever expressly agreed as to the location
of the boundary between them, if they have
occupied their respective premises up to an open
boundary line visibly marked by monuments,
fences or buildings for a long period of time
and mutually recognized it is the dividing line
between them, the law will imply an agreement
fixing the boundary as located, if it can do so
consistently with the facts appearing, and will
not permit the parties nor their grantees to depart from such line . . . "
Thus, where there is no express agreement the evidence of acquiescence is used to imply the agreement.
However:
" . . . A review of the Utah cases involving
boundary disputes reveals that it has long been
recognized in this state that when the location
5
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of the true boundary between two adjoinig tracts
of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the
owners thereof may, by parol agreement, establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably
bind themselves and their grantees."-Brown Y.
Milliner, supra.
Under respondents' suggestion, there would be no
difference between boundary by acquiescence and
boundary by agreement except for an agreement. They
would still require the same proof for both. This is
not in agreement with the authorities which use acquiescence to imply the agreement where there was no
agreement.
In cases where the agreement relied upon for the
boundary is oral, the agreement " . . . is not within the
statute of frauqs when the true line is uncertain or in
dispute, because such agreement is not regarded as
passing title to land but 'determines the location of the
existing estate of each, and, when followed by possession and occupancy, binds them, not by way of passing
title, but as determining the true location of the boundary line between their lands.' Berghoefer v. Frazier,
150 Ill. 577, 37 N.E. 914". Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah
57, 276 P. 912.

See also Schleining v. White, 163 Colo. 484 431
P.2d 458 (1967).

The "acquiescence" which respondent suggests is
necessary is really a showing of performance of the
agreement by recognizing the boundary and thus making the parol agreement enforceable.

6
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,

,

Mr. Lindner's erection of the fence and the occupation and possession of the area up to the fence (R.
64) shows performance of the agreement making it an
executed agreement. Mr. Lindner also stated that he
had received no complaint concerning the location of
the fence until just before this suit was filed, some twelve
years before the fence was completed ( R. 65) . There
is no evidence of any objection, complaint or disagreement with the location of the fence by Robert Dover
from 1955 to his death. In addition, it should be noted
that Frank Dover testified in 1957, two months before
Robert Dover's death, that he, Frank Dover, com-:
plained to Mr. Lindner about the location of the fence
(R. 75). However, Robert Dover died in 1957 (R. 73)
and the quit claim deed conveying the land in question
to Frank Dover, Exhibit P-2 through which he claims
an interest in this land was not executed until December 7, 1957 and it was not recorded until January 7,
1958. If Frank Dover talked to Mr. Lindner about
the fence as he testified, two months before Robert
Dover's death, it would have had to have been some
time before Frank Dover had acquired any interest in
the land and thus could not be taken as an objection
by any party in interest as to the location of the boundary line. It also is interesting to note that nothing more
was said or done about the location of the boundary
until 1967 when this suit was filed. Mr. Dover never
objected while he owned the property.
Mr. Carter is a successor in title to one who has
entered into an executed agreement as to the location
7
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of a boundary line and as such is bound by that agreement. Schleining v. White, supra; Brown v. ll-Iilliner,
supra.
3. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DE-

NIED DAMAGES.
Respondents, in their brief, have advanced no theory
upon which Carter is entitled to recover any damages.
The trial court in Finding of Fact No. 6 ( R. 30)
found "that such fence was erected pursuant to a conversation with Robert Dover, who gave defendants
permission to erect a fence there." This finding is supported by the evidence. Lindner testified as to the
agreement between himself and Robert Dover under ,
which the fence was constructed. The location of the
fence and boundary is further supported by the fact
that no controversy arose during Robert Dover's life.
If respondent, Carter, claims damages as a result
of trespass, he has failed to establish it. A trespasser
is one who make an unauthorized entry on another's
property. 87 C.J.S. 956. Here, the entry was authorized.
If damages are claimed for failure to pay rent,
there has been no showing of an agreement or contract
to pay rent and no showing of facts from which an obligation may be implied.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the uncontroverted testimony as to the
agreement, the performance of the agreement by construction of the fence, the occupation of the area up to
the fence, and the twelve-year period between the agreement and this suit, the boundary line has been established by an executed agreement. This case must be
reversed with directions to enter a judgment in favor
of the Lindners and the Woods quieting their title to
the disputed land.
Respectfully submitted,

E. J. SKEEN
R. C. SKEEN
Attorneys for Appellants
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